Civil Mediation in Taiwan: Legal Culture and the Process of Legal Modernization by Lin, Yun-Hsien Diana
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Mediation in Taiwan: Legal Culture and 
the Process of Legal Modernization 
 
Yun-Hsien Diana Lin* 
The process of legal modernization in Taiwan began in 1895, when the 
Japanese colonial government first imposed westernized modern law on 
Taiwan.  Before 1895, the code of imperial Ch’ing—deeply influenced by 
the Confucian legal culture which emphasized social harmony and was 
opposed to lawsuits—had been the state law for more than two centuries.  
A second major transition started in the 1920s, during which Taiwanese 
people gradually became accustomed to accessing modern courts for their 
civil disputes, and the number of civil lawsuits eventually surpassed that 
of cases under mediation.  The positive attitude toward civil litigation 
continued after the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan in 1949.  
As a historical coincidence, the Nationalists also applied German- and 
Japanese-style legal codes in Taiwan, including double tracks of town 
mediation and family court mediation.  Besides addressing this “law-
versus-custom” dichotomy, the following article concerns itself mainly 
with the continuing and ever-evolving process of dialectic and mutual 
resistance between the different legal orders. 
 
                                                 
* Yun-Hsien Diana Lin is an Associate Professor at the Institute of Law for Science and 
Technology, National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan.  The author received her J.S.D. and 
LL.M. degrees from the University of California, Berkeley, and a B.A. from National 
Taiwan University.  This research was supported by the governmental grants of National 
Science Council, R.O.C. (No. 98-2410-H-007-041).  An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the 2010 Inaugural East Asian Law and Society Conference at Hong Kong 
University and the 2009 World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in 
Beijing, China.  The author would like to thank Professor Tony Carty, Faculty of Law, 
University of Hong Kong, for excellent comments, and the Honorable Justice Peter Rose, 
Family Court of Australia, for thought-stimulating discussion. 
192 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 6 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION........................................................................ 192 
II.  THE CONFUCIAN INFLUENCES ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE 
ANTI-LAWSUIT ATTITUDE, LAW AS PUNISHMENT, COLLECTIVISM 
AND FAMILY-CENTERED ETHICS ................................................... 194 
A.  The Anti-Lawsuit Attitude................................................ 195 
B.  Law as Punishment ........................................................... 195 
C.  Collectivism ...................................................................... 196 
D.  Family-Centered Ethics .................................................... 197 
III. MEDIATION IN TAIWAN DURING JAPANESE COLONIAL TIMES: 
1895–1945 .................................................................................... 199 
IV. MEDIATION IN THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT ERA:  1949–
PRESENT ........................................................................................ 202 
A.  Town Mediation................................................................ 205 
B.  Court Mediation ................................................................ 207 
V.  INTERACTIONS BETWEEN STATE LAW AND TRADITIONAL 
CHINESE LEGAL CULTURE............................................................. 210 
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 214 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The history of the law in Taiwan can be traced back to multiple 
sources, which contribute to its diversified and hybrid legal culture.  
Before the Westerners occupied part of Taiwan in the 17th century,1 the 
majority inhabitants of Taiwan were aboriginal people who have long 
applied tribal laws for dispute resolution.  Most aboriginal laws and 
customs were passed by word of mouth.  Each Taiwanese tribe had a chief 
who was often chosen by his bloodline and who was responsible for the 
arbitration of tribal disputes.2  In 1624, the Netherlands established a 
defensive Castle in Anping as her colonial capital under the auspices of 
the United East India Company.  In need of laborers, the Dutch had begun 
to import Han Chinese workers from southeast China since 1630, many of 
whom settled and thus brought traditional Chinese laws and customs to 
                                                 
1 In 1624, the Dutch built a commercial base in southern Taiwan called Anping; and in 
1626, the Spanish landed on and occupied northern Taiwan in Keelong and Tamsui so as 
to extend foreign trade.  The Spanish rule ended in 1642 while the Dutch colonial period 
lasted until 1662.  Since the Spanish stayed for only 16 years and limited their control to 
northern Taiwan, this article focuses more on the island’s occupation by the Netherlands, 
who later controlled the south, north and east of Taiwan for 38 years. 
2 Tay-Sheng Wang, Chapter 4: Taiwan, in ASIAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: LAW, SOCIETY AND 
PLURALISM IN EAST ASIA 158–61 (Poh-Ling Tan ed., 1997). 
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Taiwan.3  The Dutch colonists maintained a system of legal pluralism:  a 
Court of Justice was established for adjudication of disputes involving 
Europeans, where Dutch law would apply; if the case concerned 
Taiwanese aboriginals, the chief or elders of the tribe would arbitrate in 
accordance with tribal laws and customs; and if disagreements were 
among Han Chinese immigrants, the customs of the Han people would 
prevail.4  Generally, the three types of law coexisted in harmony during 
the 38 years of Dutch rule. 
The Chinese regime in Taiwan was first established when Cheng 
Chenggong, also known as Koxinga, led naval ships from southeast China 
and drove away the Dutch in 1662.5  The Cheng regime controlled Taiwan 
for 22 years until imperial Ch’ing took over.6  During the 212 years of 
Ch’ing rule, traditional Chinese law became the dominant legal culture in 
Taiwan. 7   One important reason was the increase of Han Chinese 
population between 1680 and 1892:  as recorded in historical documents 
the Han population grew by a factor of 10, to 250 million, while the 
Taiwanese aborigines became a minority in Taiwan.8  The other reason 
lies in assimilation:  as commercial and cultural exchange between ethnic 
groups occurred, many aboriginal tribes assimilated to Han culture and 
even adopted Han identities.9  As a result, although traditional Chinese 
law is not the only element that shaped Taiwan’s legal culture, it is 
without doubt the most influential one. 
This article examines the process of legal modernization in 
Taiwan and its implications for civil mediation.  To understand the context 
of civil mediation in Taiwan, the next part presents four aspects of 
traditional Chinese legal culture based on Confucian thought.  Part III 
focuses on Taiwan’s first contact with westernized laws.  It explores 
possible reasons for the increase in civil litigation until it surpassed civil 
mediation during the Japanese colonial period.  Part IV discusses town 
mediation after 1949 and its differences from prior systems with the same 
name.  Taiwan’s latest developments in family court mediation are also 
introduced.  Part V looks at the interaction between westernized state law 
                                                 
3  YONG-HE CAO, TAIWAN ZAOQI LISHI YANJIU [EARLY-PERIOD TAIWAN HISTORICAL 
STUDIES] 61–65 (1979). 
4 TAY-SHENG WANG, TAIWAN FALÜ SHI GAILUN [GENERAL DISCUSSION ON TAIWANESE 
LEGAL HISTORY] 27 (2004). 
5 WANG, supra note 2, at 266–67. 
6 Following the defeat of Koxinga’s grandson in 1683 by the Qing Dynasty, Taiwan was 
formally annexed by a Chinese regime and was placed under the jurisdiction of Fujian 
province. 
7 WANG, supra note 4, at 33. 
8  SHAO-SHIN CHEN, TAIWAN DE REN KO BIEN CHIEN YÜ SHE HUI BIEN CHIEN 
[DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL TRANSITIONS IN TAIWAN] 379–81 (1979). 
9 WANG, supra note 4, at 33. 
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and traditional customs from the perspective of legal pluralism.  Part VI 
concludes. 
II. THE CONFUCIAN INFLUENCES ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE 
ANTI-LAWSUIT ATTITUDE, LAW AS PUNISHMENT, 
COLLECTIVISM AND FAMILY-CENTERED ETHICS 
The Confucian tradition is often noted as an important factor in 
understanding many East Asian societies, such as South Korea, China and 
Taiwan.  Founded by Confucius, Confucianism was not viewed merely as 
a valuable stream of philosophy, but was incorporated as part of the 
everyday life of Chinese people. 10   Indeed, it may be that because 
Confucianism thus exists in a less visible and more diffuse state, it is 
exerting an unconscious and therefore more powerful influence on 
people’s lives.11  Clifford Geertz defines culture as the fabric of meaning 
in terms of which human beings interpret their experience and guide their 
action.12  On this view, law is also a part of culture, for to be meaningful 
to the people it regulates the law must partake of the resources within the 
culture.13  To that extent, Confucianism may influence legal discourse 
because legal meaning largely depends on cultural signs and narrative.14 
In contrast to the general agreement that Confucianism is still an 
important part of East Asian societies, there is little agreement as to what 
Confucianism means or which elements of East Asian culture are 
attributable to Confucianism.  Many things commonly counted as part of 
the Confucian legacy, such as family centered ethics, respect for elders 
and social harmony can also be described as attributes of many other 
cultures in different areas of the world and in different historical periods.  
Chaihark Hahm therefore argues that, while similar culture attributes can 
be found in other places, the way in which they are combined to form a 
“package” reveals the unique nature of Confucianism in East Asian 
culture. 15   In order to draw up some abstract character traits from 
Confucian culture, it is Hahm’s suggestion that the discussion should be 
country-specific, for it is impractical to expect Confucianism to have the 
same status and value among East Asian countries.16  Also, since the same 
                                                 
10 Shin-Yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From The Legal Culture 
Perspective, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 13, 21 (2000). 
11 Chaihark Hahm, Law, Culture and the Politics of Confucianism, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 
253, 270 (2003). 
12 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 145 (1977). 
13 Sally E. Merry, Law, Culture, and Cultural Appropriation, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 575, 
578 (1998). 
14 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term: Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983).  
15 Hahm, supra note 11, at 268. 
16 Id. 
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Confucian influence can work in different ways depending on the concrete 
issues involved, it is helpful to be issue-specific when discussing the 
cultural underpinnings of certain laws.17 
A. The Anti-Lawsuit Attitude 
Particularly, Confucianists in ancient China emphasized the 
importance of social harmony, which is still valued highly in 
contemporary Taiwan.  In maintaining interpersonal harmony, the 
Confucianist expressed disfavor towards resolving disputes via a lawsuit.  
Confucius once said, “In hearing litigation, I am just like another man.  
But I try always to eliminate the need for litigation[.]”18  Accordingly, the 
Confucian regarded litigation as a last resort in resolving a dispute.  This 
anti-lawsuit attitude has been adopted by Chinese people for centuries and 
thus provides fertile soil for the development of mediation.  Through 
mediation, disputants are allowed to seek solution to their conflict by 
mutual compromise while still maintaining harmony. 
Apart from the Confucian teachings on social harmony, Chinese 
people also avoided lawsuits for various practical reasons.  For one, 
frequent delays often occurred and corruption in the system for 
administration of justice was well-known. Besides, the courts were not 
usually located at the site of disputes, thus it was very difficult for 
peasants to petition the court due to the long distance of travel and the 
time away from work.19  Lastly, the magistrates often were associated with 
powerful local figures, which caused people to harbor distrust when 
members of the powerful classes were involved in disputes. 
B. Law as Punishment 
Another factor that contributed to the prevalence of mediation is 
the traditional Chinese concept of law as mainly punitive in nature.  To 
Chinese minds, the law was nothing more than the imposition of fines and 
penalties for official transgression.20  Since law meant punishment, the 
imperial law was in effect criminal law, with only a few provisions on 
civil issues such as family, marriage, adoption, inheritance, property and 
debts.  The ancient Confucianists believed that an ideal society would 
                                                 
17 Id. at 268–69. 
18 See Analects of Confucius, ch. XII, verse 13. 
19 Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 
1201, 1213 (1966). 
20 WILLIAM H. MCNEILL & JEAN W. SEDLAR, CLASSICAL CHINA 76 (1960). 
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never require extensive legislation or litigation, because the law was for 
barbarians, not for a civilized society.21 
Moreover, imperial China employed criminal punishment even for 
civil disputes.  All types of litigation, including marriage and property 
issues, were subject to criminal procedures that included torture and 
corporal punishment.  As a result, being a party to a lawsuit was viewed as 
involvement in a crime both in the judge’s and in society’s eyes.22  Since 
people were treated in a humiliating manner in court, it was considered a 
shame to be involved in a lawsuit and thus people inclined to settle 
matters outside of the court, especially civil disputes. 
C. Collectivism 
Confucianism honors selfless righteous deeds and often contrasts 
these with personal interests, which it labels trivial or less important.23  To 
carry out righteous conduct, one must calculate profit not for oneself but 
for the greater good.  As a result, asserting one’s personal rights was 
generally not encouraged by society.  The traditional expectation of a 
selfless individual became one of the obstacles to adoption of modern civil 
litigation. 
For Confucianists, the mutual obligation between the individual 
and his family serve as powerful social control agent.  The individual’s 
responsibility to his family and the family’s responsibility to the 
individual are interdependent.24  This is in sharp contrast to western 
individualism, and its emphasis on personal rights.  Collectivism, which 
emphasized group and communal goals, has been the norm for traditional 
Chinese society.25  While individualist cultures consider placing personal 
goals ahead of collective goals to be acceptable, in collectivist cultures it 
is socially desirable to place collective goals ahead of personal goals.26 
                                                 
21 See DEREK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 21–22 (1973) 
(discussing the idea that Confucianism always emphasized using reason to educate people 
because ritual and education—rather than law—represented the most essential way to 
attain social goals; moreover, education could prevent future wrongdoing, whereas law 
only punished what had already happened, and therefore could only serve the limited 
purpose of punishing evil but not of encouraging the good). 
22 JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 12 (2008). 
23 See Analects of Confucius, ch. IV, verse 23 (containing Confucius’s statement that “[a] 
gentleman understands righteousness while a petty man understands profits”).  See also id. 
ch. XVII, verse 23 (“[A] gentleman who has courage but not righteousness will cause 
disorder; a petty man who has courage but not righteousness will cause thievery.”). 
24 Peng, supra note 10, at 24; REN XIN, TRADITION OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE 
TRADITION: LAW, STATE AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINA 25–27 (1997). 
25 BEE-CHEN GOH, NEGOTIATING WITH THE CHINESE 24–27 (1996). 
26  Harry C. Triandis, Cross-Cultural Studies of Individualism and Collectivism, in 
NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 1989 (No. 37): CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 
42 (Richard A. Dienstbier & John J. Berman eds., 1990). 
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As a typical example, a potential breakdown of marriage between 
couples was not viewed as a personal matter.27  Rather, the dispute soon 
became the pre-occupation of the two families, even the entire village or 
community.  Since divorce has been regarded as a disgrace throughout 
history, every effort was directed at reconciliation of the marriage for the 
purpose of safeguarding the reputation and social standing of the families.  
Whether the couple still had feelings for each other was not the main 
concern in the process of dispute resolution. 
D. Family-Centered Ethics 
The above discussion of cultural background leads us to a 
discussion of how the concept of family shaped the traditional Chinese 
way of dispute resolution.  This view of interpersonal relationships was 
demonstrated through the mode of differential association formulated by 
the Chinese sociologist and anthropologist Hsiao-Tung Fei.  According to 
Fei, a Chinese society’s social pattern is like the different myriads of 
ripples sent out by a stone thrown in the water.  Everyone is situated in the 
center of a circle created by one’s social connections, and those affected 
by the ripples of the circle are also linked with each other.28  Among the 
different circles, family plays an essential role and was regarded as the 
most basic unit in Chinese society.29  Of the five “cardinal relationships” 
advocated by Confucianists, three lie within the family: the relationships 
between father and son, elder and younger brother, and husband and 
wife.30 
Filial piety is still emphasized in father-son relations in 
contemporary China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.  To observe 
filial piety, Confucius instructed, one must obey one’s parents without 
complaining.31  This teaching also extends to other elders in the family 
and the clan.  The notion that a parent’s status was higher than that of a 
child’s was embedded in state law throughout Chinese legal history.32  For 
                                                 
27  Michael Palmer, The Revival of Mediation in the People’s Republic of China, in 
YEARBOOK ON SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEMS: 1987, at 250–51 (W. E. Butler ed., 1988). 
28 Regarding the mode of differential association in Chinese interpersonal relationships, 
see generally HSIAO-TUNG FEI, RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA: PERSPECT AND 
RETROSPECT (1989). 
29 Peng, supra note 10, at 24. 
30 The remaining two could be viewed as an expansion of the other three:  the lord-subject 
relation was an extension of that of father and son, and the bond among friends grew out of 
the connection between elder and younger brothers. 
31 See Analects of Confucius, ch. IV, verse 18 (citing Confucius as saying, “[i]n serving 
parents, make suggestions tactfully, and if your aspirations are not pursued, still respect 
and do not disobey, bear burdens and do not complain”). 
32 HWEI-SHIN CHEN, INDIVIDUAL, FAMILY, MARRIAGE AND THE STATE: RESEARCH AND 
METHODOLOGY OF CHINESE LEGAL HISTORY 256–58 (2006).  
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example, according to the Code of the T’ang Dynasty,33 parents were 
entitled to give children corporal punishment, even after the offspring 
reached their majority.34  If the parent’s chastisement caused the child’s 
death, it was not viewed as a crime.  But the child would face the 
punishment of exile if it showed unfilial behavior toward the parents.  
Moreover, a child which scolded its parents could be sentenced to death.35 
As for relations among siblings, brothers are known in Chinese 
terms as “hands and feet,” which means one is expected to love his or her 
brothers as one’s own limbs.  According to Confucianism, filial piety and 
brotherhood are the fundamental elements of benevolence, the highest 
moral standard of a gentleman.36  Over the centuries these scriptural 
guidelines—both positive and negative—have shaped people’s 
expectations and behavior, which in turn influenced the Chinese way of 
dealing with family disputes.37  For instance, the clan usually delegated to 
its elders the role of arbitrating disputes because of their authority.38  Also, 
one was expected to obey one’s eldest brother, while an eldest brother was 
held accountable for the doings of his younger siblings. 
In the eyes of traditional Chinese society, a wife’s social and legal 
status was inferior to the husband’s; and one’s maternal relatives were less 
important than their paternal counterparts.  For example, grandparents on 
the maternal side are called “external” (外, wai) grandparents in Chinese.  
This is partly because in the patriarchal Chinese society, when a couple 
gets married it is understood that the wife is joining the husband’s family, 
rather than vice versa.  According to the Code of the Imperial Ch’ing, 
when the husband passed away inheritance of his estate passed on to his 
son, not his widow.39  The unequal legal status of husband and the wife 
was also demonstrated in laws on family violence.  A woman could face 
the death penalty if she dared to hit her husband, even if the husband 
sustained no injury at all.  On the contrary, only when a husband’s 
violence severely injured the wife could the law intervene on her behalf.40 
                                                 
33 The T’ang Code (Tang Lü, 唐律), following the pattern of several earlier codes 
(including the Sui-era Kaihuang Lü), described the “ten abominations”—or ten major vices 
singled out for harsh punishment under law—which included plotting treason, the failure 
to abide by filial piety, scolding parents or grandparents, and moving out of the family 
home while parents or grandparents are still alive. 
34 WANG, supra note 4, at 40. 
35 Id. at 41. 
36 See Analects of Confucius, ch. I, verse 2. 
37  Charlotte Ikels, Introduction, in FILIAL PIETY: PRACTICE AND DISCOURSE IN 
CONTEMPORARY EAST ASIA 3–4 (Charlotte Ikels ed., 2004). 
38 Jin Zhan, Zhongguo Chuantong Tiaojie Zhidu de Yunxing Jizhi ji Qi Tedian [The 
Mechanism and Characteristics of Ancient Chinese Mediation Systems], 18(4) JOURNAL OF 
BEIJING INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION 38, 38–39 (2004). 
39 TUNG-TSU CHU, CHUNG GUO FA LÜ YÜ CHUNG GUO SHE HUI [LAW AND SOCIETY IN 
TRADITIONAL CHINA] 132–42 (1984). 
40 Id. 
2011]  CIVIL MEDIATION IN TAIWAN         199      
 
The dominant influence of Confucianism has been passed down to 
each generation of Han Chinese in Taiwan, together with its anti-lawsuit 
attitude, its notion of law as punishment, its collectivist ideals and outlook 
and its family-centered ethics system.  As a result, these concepts have 
been preserved and practiced in Taiwan until the impact of the 
Westernized law brought over by the Japanese colonial government and, 
later on, the Nationalist government. 
III. MEDIATION IN TAIWAN DURING JAPANESE COLONIAL TIMES: 
1895–1945 
The process of legal modernization in Taiwan began when Japan 
gained control over Taiwan in 1895, as a result of its victory in the Sino-
Japanese War.41  During the Japanese occupation, the number of Japanese 
in Taiwan was rather small, amounting to only 6% of the total population 
in 1942, yet ruling over the remaining 94% of the population, comprised 
mainly of Han Chinese and Taiwanese aboriginal tribes.42  By 1895, Japan 
had completed its own modern codes, modeled on German laws of the late 
nineteenth century. 43   However, due to Taiwanese armed resistance 
against military takeover, in the beginning the Japanese government 
adopted English colonial laws to rule this newly-acquired land.44  In other 
words, modern Western law was first introduced to colonial Taiwan in late 
nineteenth century, which is much earlier than the case in China.  It should 
be noted, however, that Japanese colonial government maintained the “old 
customs” of the Han Chinese in dealing with family disputes.  Later, in 
1923, as the policy of cultural assimilation continued, Japan started to 
extend its own laws to Taiwan, including civil codes, commercial codes 
and many administrative laws and rules.45  “State law” in this article is 
used to describe the positive law of the state, including legislation, 
executive measures and judicial decisions, which have been the primary 
way of imposing modern western laws on Taiwan. 
As aforementioned, the Han Chinese who migrated from mainland 
China carried with them the traditional Chinese legal culture which was 
reinforced through the Code and rule of the imperial Ch’ing.  As a result, 
the Han Chinese population in Taiwan preferred to settle disputes out of 
                                                 
41 Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, also 
known as the Treaty of Maguan, signed by the representatives of Japanese government and 
imperial Ching. 
42 CHEN, supra note 8, at 96–97. 
43  Dan F. Henderson, Law and Political Modernization in Japan, in POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN MODERN JAPAN 419–36 (Robert E. Ward ed., 1968). 
44  Henry J. Lamley, Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: the Vicissitudes of 
Colonialism, in TAIWAN: A NEW HISTORY 204–06 (Murry A. Rubinstein ed., 1999). 
45 TAY-SHENG WANG, LEGAL REFORM IN TAIWAN UNDER JAPANESE COLONIAL RULE 
1895–1945: THE RECEPTION OF WESTERN LAW 52–55 (2000). 
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court and via informal means.  During the rule of the Ch’ing, there were 
two types of mediation: clan mediation and local mediation.46  Clan 
mediation was presided over by “the elder and virtuous” of the clan, with 
its legitimacy based on both state law and clan rules.47  Elders of a clan 
were given the power to punish a member who violated their clan’s 
rules. 48   Therefore, families and clans had significant influence in 
Taiwanese dispute resolution.  Leaders in the small local geographic 
divisions called shiang pao were locally powerful and usually served as 
mediators.49  Shiang pao were themselves responsible for the behavior of 
the local populace and provided local resolution to disputes which erupted 
within the district.  This network of clan leaders and shiang pao often 
overlapped, working hand in hand to ensure social order and harmony. 
Under Japanese colonial rule, two kinds of mediation were 
utilized for the purpose of local dispute resolution.  One was known as 
pao chia (保甲).  The word pao was used standing alone to specify an 
organization comprised of a hundred families, and chia to refer to 10 
family units.  The leaders of a pao chia were appointed and directed in 
their role as agents of social control by Japanese police officers and thus 
emerged as the new local leaders.50  A pao zhang, the leader of a pao, was 
given the right to mediate simple civil issues; among them were the 
division of family property and dissolution of marriage. 
At the same time, civil disputes were also mediated by the chief of 
the district government according to Han Chinese “old customs.”51  The 
mediation under Japanese rule however, was very different from 
traditional Chinese clan mediation or shiang pao.  According to the 1904 
Civil Disputes Mediation Law, a party who failed to be present at a 
mediation faced visits to the police station and the imposition of a fine; 
once a solution was reached by the parties, subsequent lawsuits were 
forbidden and the mediated solution was enforced by the district 
government.52  It is fair to conclude that the colonial government extended 
its control through such district administrative mediation. 
Initially influenced by the traditional Han Chinese anti-lawsuit 
attitude, most disputants preferred mediation to litigation in colonial 
                                                 
46 See Jin, supra note 38, at 38. 
47 See CHEN, supra note 8, at 96–97. 
48 Id. at 39. 
49 Shiang pao were sometimes also known as pao chia. 
50 See Chiu-Fen Hung, Rizhi Chuqi Huludun Qu Baojia Shishi de Qingxing ji Baozheng 
Juese de Tantao (1895–1909) [A Probe into the Paochia System and the Role of Pao-
cheng in the Hulutun District during the Early Period of the Japanese Occupation (1895–
1909)], 34 JIN DAI SHI YAN JIU SUO JI KAN [BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF MODERN 
HISTORY, ACADEMIA SINICA] 211, 258 (1990). 
51 See Tay-Sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: Toward A 
Liberal and Democratic Country, 11(3) PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 531, 557 (2002). 
52 Id. 
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Taiwan.  In the early period of Japanese rule, administrative mediation 
was very appealing due to its simple procedures and inexpensive fee 
structure. 53   Moreover, the administrative mediator was given wide 
discretion because civil courts had only few precedents at the time.54  In 
fact, there were also other reasons which served to discourage people from 
accessing the courts.  From their own local perspective, Taiwanese 
worried about Japanese officials’ unfamiliarity with native languages and 
customs; while from the viewpoint of the Japanese colonial authorities, 
they were reluctant to increase their monetary investment into the judicial 
system of the colony and therefore sought to promote mediation as a 
means of reducing the caseload of the courts.55 
In the 1920s however Taiwanese people gradually became 
accustomed to using modern courts to resolve civil disputes, and the 
number of civil lawsuits eventually surpassed that of administrative 
mediation.56  Partial reasons for this major transition may be found in the 
increase of judicial staff and funding, general economic progress and the 
growing prevalence of education among Taiwanese people.57  Another 
reason for the trend may be found in the fact that civil litigation 
precedents were expanding, and the wide discretion formerly enjoyed by 
administrative mediators contracted because the scope of resolution was 
limited by law and such precedents.  Little by little, Taiwanese became 
more familiar with modern court procedures, means of accessing the 
justice system, and working with and through lawyers and notaries.58  The 
more that Taiwanese reaffirmed that modern courts were able to protect 
their interests and rights efficiently and at a reasonable cost, the more they 
were likely to resort to litigation over mediation.  This increasingly 
positive attitude toward civil litigation intensified the extent of legal 
transplantation of westernized Japanese laws and accelerated the 
development of civil procedural laws in Taiwan.59 
Although the Japanese legal system replaced the imperial Ch’ing 
legal system in Taiwan, government-sanctioned practices concerning 
family and inheritance survived the transition.60 The Japanese colonial 
government found it more effective in governing their colonial society to 
employ the existing infrastructure at the level of the family and local 
community.  Reinforcing the old Taiwanese customs not only kept society 
                                                 
53 See WANG, supra note 45, at 198. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 84–85. 
56 Id. at 91–94. 
57 Id. at 204–13. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 57. 
60 See Tay-Sheng Wang, Bai Nian Lai Taiwan Falü de Xifanghua (The Westernization of 
Taiwanese Legal System for One Hundred Years), in TAIWAN FALÜ SHI DE JIANLI (THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWANESE LEGAL HISTORY) 347–48 (1997). 
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in order, but also reduced costs in law enforcement.  Moreover, upholding 
original social norms was a convenient way for Japan to uphold its own 
legitimacy in the eyes of the Taiwanese people.61  In addition, family law 
may not be as useful as criminal law or land law for purposes of social 
control; nonetheless, it is so intimately related to social norms and 
customs that it cannot be as easily changed by simply imposing new 
laws.62 
However, Japanese judges in colonial Taiwan did not adopt or 
follow every old Taiwanese custom without submitting it to further 
scrutiny.  In adjudicating family disputes they applied Taiwanese customs 
selectively.  These judges were trained in Japan to employ westernized 
Japanese laws and sometimes reinterpreted old Taiwanese customs.  
Because part of the old customs were rejected or modified in this way, 
courts in the Japanese colonial era played an essential role in shaping 
Taiwanese family law.63  For example, according to the Han Chinese legal 
practices and culture, a wife could only passively be divorced by her 
husband and could not actively pursue a divorce; having no independent 
legal standing, she was not allowed to file for a divorce by herself.  In the 
Japanese colonial courts, however, the custom was modified and 
Taiwanese wives were given legal standing against their husbands in cases 
of marriage dissolution.64  The Japanese judges’ initial goal may not have 
been gender equality, but rather to make colonial Taiwan more “civilized” 
and “modernized.”65  But via numerous and consistent judicial decisions, 
this part of the old Taiwanese customs regarding family practice was 
ultimately and irrevocably changed. 
IV. MEDIATION IN THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT ERA:  1949–
PRESENT 
After the defeat of Japan in World War II, Taiwan was 
surrendered to Allied Forces in 1945.  Later in 1949, Taiwan was acquired 
by the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, “KMT”) after it was 
overpowered by the Communist Party in mainland China, and 
subsequently the KMT reestablished the Republic of China (ROC) in 
                                                 
61  See Li-Ju Lee, Law and Social Norms in A Changing Society: A Case Study of 
Taiwanese Family Law, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 413, 426 (1999). 
62 Id. at 427. 
63 See Chao-Ju Chen, Quanli, Falü Gaige yu Bentu Fu Yun [Rights, Legal Reform and 
Local Women’s Movement], 62 CHENG TA FA HSUEH PING LUN [NATIONAL CHENGCHI 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW] 25, 40–46 (1999). 
64  See Chao-Ju Chen, Riben Shidai Taiwan Nüxing Lihun Quan de Xingcheng (the 
Formation of Taiwanese Women’s Right to Divorce in Japanese Colonial Era), in TAIWAN 
CHUNG TSENG JIN TAI HUA LUN WEN JIH [COLLECTION OF TAIWAN STRATIFIED 
MODERNIZATION] 218–20 (M. Wakabayashi & M. Wu eds., 2000). 
65 Id. at 220–29. 
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T’aipei.66  By claiming to be the sole legitimate Chinese government, the 
KMT identified itself as the advocate and true successor of Chinese 
cultural tradition.  For example, facing the destruction of Chinese culture 
during the Cultural Revolution in Mainland China, the ROC government 
initiated the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement in 1967 to preserve 
and promote traditional Chinese culture, and especially Confucianism.67 
Between the 1920s and mid-1930s, when the KMT still controlled 
mainland China, it followed the example of Meiji Japan by promulgating 
German style codes as part of its efforts to unify the country and establish 
a modern legal system.68  However, due to a state of recurrent war, the 
new laws were never actually applied in mainland China.  Only after the 
1949 military retreat did the KMT have the opportunity to enforce the new 
laws in Taiwan.  It was a historical coincidence that the new codes 
brought by KMT to Taiwan were actually modeled on Japanese laws, with 
significant German influences.  Based on the legacy of prior Japanese rule 
in Taiwan, the ROC codes were easily implemented and followed.69  
During the 1960s and 1970s, the rapid economic development of Taiwan 
facilitated the further expansion and progress of these civil and 
commercial codes.70  To add to the diversity of legal transplantations, 
American legal concepts were initially introduced to the Taiwanese people 
in the midst of the Cold War, when the ROC government joined the 
Western camp led by the US.71 
After 1949, the number of lawsuits continued to grow due to the 
process of urbanization.72  When people relocated to the cities for job 
opportunities, they often had difficulty finding a well-respected mediator 
                                                 
66  Kuomintang, NEWWORLDENCYCLOPEDIA.ORG (Dec. 15, 2008, 2:40 PM), 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/kuomintang#KMT_in_Taiwan (“In 
December of 1949, [Chiang Kai-Shek] moved [to Taiwan], along with approximately two 
million Nationalists . . . . [where] the KMT established a provisional government . . . which 
it called the Republic of China (ROC), claiming it to be the legitimate government of 
China.”).  See also Party’s History, KUOMINTANG OFFICIAL WEBSITE, 
http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=para&mnum=108 (last visited June 9, 
2012) (providing a chart with information about more than a century of the KMT’s history, 
which relates that on December 10, 1949, “[f]ollowing the government of the Republic of 
China, the Kuomintang relocates to Taiwan . . . . [and] Party headquarters are set up at No. 
11 Zhongshan South Road”). 
67 Since 1967, Confucianism has been integrated into teaching materials for elementary 
and middle school level in Taiwan.  See Taiwan R.O.C. government information office 
website, available at http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/taiwan-story/culture/down/3-3.htm (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2010). 
68 See WANG, supra note 51, at 535–36. 
69 See WANG, supra note 45, at 174–83. 
70 See WANG, supra note 51, at 537–38. 
71 See generally Kaufman Winn & Tang-Chi Yeh, Advocating Democracy: The Role of 
Lawyers in Taiwan’s Political Transformation, 20(2) LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 579 
(1995). 
72 Wang, supra note 2, at 154. 
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who could be trusted by both parties.  As a result, state authorities such as 
courts were relied upon to solve civil disputes.  The capitalistic economy 
also raised complicated commercial disputes involving, for example, 
issues of intellectual property that could only be decided by a court.73  In 
other words, an agricultural economy and face-to-face interpersonal 
relations used to form the foundation of mediation.  Such a foundation has 
been changed and transformed during the process of industrialization and 
urbanization since the 1960s.74 
The lifting of martial law in 1987 opened up a new era for legal 
development in Taiwan.  Echoing the political transformation toward 
democracy, there have been strong demands for judicial reform in Taiwan.  
According to Judicial Statistics, one of the factors that deterred people 
from accessing the courts was the unreasonable delay involved in lawsuits, 
which was caused by an understaffed judicial workforce and the heavy 
caseload.75  Judicial reform is still an ongoing project in Taiwan.  Mainly 
carried out by lawyers and professors, groups such as the Foundation of 
Judicial Reform have sought to revise laws to create a more transparent 
judicial procedure, to improve courts’ demeanor and competence, and to 
better protect human rights and access to justice.76 
Among the boom in social movements since after 1987, child 
welfare activists and women’s groups have advocated the rights of women 
and children through the revision of Family Law.77  Taiwan’s Family Law 
is contained in two separate parts of the Civil Code:  the Division of 
Relatives and the Division of Succession.78  Although Family Law in 
Taiwan incorporated some modern ideas when first enacted in 1930, it 
also upheld traditional patriarchal values and was criticized for 
discriminating against women, disregarding child welfare and reinforcing 
unequal gender roles.79  In response to the public pressure fostered by 
activists and social groups, family law went through seven major 
amendments from 1985 to 2007.  The revision of the law coincided with 
political changes, economic growth and development of women’s 
                                                 
73 Id. 
74 Lee, supra note 61, at 414–15. 
75 The average number of days to close a civil case was 53.95 days in 1996, which 
gradually increased to 111.12 days in 2001, and then dropped to 71.57 days in 2005.  See 
Judicial Statistics, available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/year95/8 (last visited June 
6, 2000). 
76 For details about judicial reform in Taiwan, see Judicial Reform Foundation, available 
at http://www.jrf.org.tw/newjrf/english.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
77 Lee, supra note 61, at 436. 
78 See Minfa (民法) [Civil Code] [hereinafter Civil Code], Qinshu bian (亲属篇) [Division 
of Relatives], art. 967 to art. 1137; Jicheng bian (继承篇) [Division of Succession], art. 
1138 to art. 1225 (Taiwan). 
79 Janice A. Lee, Family Law of the Two Chinas: A Comparative Look at the Rights of 
Married Women in the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China, 5 CARDOZO 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 217, 217 (1997).  
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movement in Taiwan.80  The new Family Law incorporated the principles 
of gender equality and the best interests of the child, while emphasizing 
the state’s role as guardian of disadvantaged family members in various 
matters, such as those involving domestic violence.81   The trend of 
heightening state legal intervention in the family not only helps to break 
down the boundary between the traditionally-separate public and private 
spheres, but also provides a foundation and increased legitimacy for state-
sponsored family mediation. 
A. Town Mediation 
The Act of Town Mediation (hereinafter, the Act) was enacted in 
1955 and most recently amended in 2007.82  Under the Act, a mediation 
committee composed of seven to fifteen mediators is in charge of 
mediating civil disputes as well as minor criminal cases.83  Different from 
mediation under the Japanese occupation, which was generally 
administrative in nature, town mediation after 1949 shows more profound 
judicial influences.  The control exercised by the judicial branch over this 
mediation can be demonstrated in two ways:  (i) the process of recruiting 
mediators, and (ii) the judicial supervision of mediation. 
Under the 2002 Amendment to the Act, potential mediators in a 
particular township were initially to be nominated to a pool by the town 
administrative chief, and then elected to their positions by the township’s 
Representative Assembly.84  To further cultivate mediator impartiality, 
after 2005 neither administrative heads nor current members of the 
legislature were to be allowed to join a mediation committee.85  Moreover, 
if a dispute involved the mediator or his family, the mediator was to 
recuse himself from the particular mediation upon the request of a 
disputant.86  Furthermore, the power to decide on town mediators was then 
to be transferred from the Representative Assembly to the trial court or the 
district attorney’s office nearest to the town.87  Since local powerful 
                                                 
80  Yuan-Chen Lee, How the Feminist Movement Won Media Space in Taiwan: 
Observation by A Feminist Activist, in SPACES OF THEIR OWN: WOMEN’S PUBLIC SPHERE IN 
TRANSNATIONAL CHINA 95–113 (Mayfair Mei-Hui Yang ed., 1999). 
81 Li-Ju Lee, Fabu Ru Jiamen? Jiashifa Yanbian De Falu: Shehuixiao Fenxi [Between the 
State and the Family—A Study of Recent Taiwanese Family Law Development], 10 
ZHONGYUAN CAIJING FAXIAO [CHUNG YUAN FIN. & ECON. L. REV.] 41, 83 (2003). 
82 See Taiwan Ministry of Justice, Database of Law, available at 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Scripts/Query4A.asp?FullDoc=all&Fcode=I0020003 (last visited 
July 23, 2010). 
83 See Xiang Zhen Shi Tiaojie Tiaoli (乡镇市调解条例) [Act of Town Mediation], art. 1 
and art. 2 (Taiwan) [hereinafter, the Act]. 
84 See the Act, art. 3. 
85 Id. art. 5. 
86 Id. art. 16. 
87 Id. art. 3. 
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figures often occupy administrative and legislative positions in the 
townships, the 2002 Amendment also aims to reduce potential conflicts of 
interest by setting limitations on who may participate in mediation 
committees.  Besides their power to decide upon town mediators, trial 
courts possess the power to review settlements made at the town level to 
see whether they are consistent with existing law.88  Once confirmed by a 
judge, the settlement receives legal status making it automatically 
enforceable, and disputants are enjoined from launching subsequent 
litigation on the decided matter.89  This binding effect is similar to that of 
administrative mediations conducted during the Japanese colonial period. 
According to statistics provided by Taiwan’s Ministry of the 
Interior, cases of town mediation have increased from around 45,000 in 
1991 to 112,000 in 2008.90  Apparently, urbanization and industrialization 
have not been responsible for this rise in the overall number of mediated 
cases, as they have with litigation.  The nature of disputes leading to an 
increased caseload has in either case been different.  The statistics indicate 
that the number of civil mediation cases has not changed much since 1995, 
whereas criminal mediation cases have grown tremendously.  Since 2003, 
the number of criminal cases has surpassed civil ones.  According to the 
latest data, among all the cases which were submitted to town mediation 
during 2008, only about 43% were civil cases, while 57% were criminal 
cases.91  One field study pointed out that the notable increase of traffic 
accidents during this period actually accounts for the boost to town 
mediation figures.92 
Although town mediation in Taiwan seems to be modernized, 
some aspects of the system still show traces of Confucian thought.  For 
example, mediators tend to be mostly elder males.  In fact, prior to 2005 
more than 85% of mediators were male.93  It was not until 2005—when 
cases involving domestic violence were on the rise—that a new provision 
was added to the Act, proclaiming that one fourth of mediator positions 
were henceforth to be reserved for female mediators.94  As a result in 2008 
the overall percentage of male mediators dropped to 72%, but they still 
comprise 78% of mediators over fifty years of age.95  This common 
                                                 
88 Id. art. 26. 
89 Id. art. 27. 
90 Department of Statistics, Taiwan Ministry of the Interior, available at 
http://www.moi.gov.tw/stat/english/index.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2010). 
91 See Nei Cheng Tung Chi Tong Bao [Statistics of the Interior Report], avaliable at 
http://www.moi.gov.tw/files/news_file/week9715.doc (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
92 Shao-Wu Jung, Wen Hua Fa Lu yu Tze Lue: Shiang Chen Tiao Jie Guo Cheng de In Jio 
[Culture, Law and Strategy: Research on the Process of Town Mediation], 38 TAI WAN 
SHE HUI XIAO KAN [THE TAIWANESE JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY] 57, 70 (2007). 
93 Statistics of the Interior Report, supra note 90. 
94 The Act, art. 3, para. 4. 
95 Statistics of the Interior Report, supra note 90. 
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practice is consistent with Confucian teachings on gender roles and the 
respect due to elders. 
One commentator has pointed out that many town mediators 
consider mediation as a forum in which to reach a compromise and avoid 
litigation, restoring social harmony, a concept closely related to the 
Confucian tradition.96  Taiwanese society is still a relationship-driven 
society composed of primary and secondary interpersonal relationships.97  
Since the maintenance of relationships, or guan shi, is more important 
than questions of actual right and wrong, fairness must be judged in the 
context of such social relations instead of according to strict justice under 
the law.98  If a mediator happens to be an acquaintance of a disputant, his 
relatives or his friends, the mediator will often appeal to mutual relations 
or guan shi as part of reaching a settlement.  Furthermore, some disputants 
have been asked to perform a favor of benevolence, or jen ch’ing, on 
behalf of an elder mediator, by thinking of the situation from the opposite 
party’s perspective and achieving conciliation.  The concept of jen ch’ing 
is a mutually-recognized social obligation, crucial to maintaining the 
“face” of both mediator and disputants. 
B. Court Mediation 
Statistics show that court mediation in Taiwan is increasing 
because of legal reforms, but has been relatively less used and less 
efficient, when compared to town mediation.  Specifically, the 1999 
amendment of the Civil Procedure Law ordained eleven types of civil 
cases as being obligated to undergo mandatory mediation before 
proceeding to litigation, including property and family disputes.99  Even at 
the litigation stage, the two parties may, upon agreement, suspend the 
lawsuit and restart court mediation.100  The new law has resulted in the 
increase of court mediation from about 47,000 cases in 1999 to 81,000 in 
2008, though that figure is still much less than the figure for cases 
mediated through town mediation.101  The percentage of successfully 
mediated cases is also low:  only around 14% were successful in 1999, but 
this grew to 47% in 2007.102  On the other hand, civil lawsuits handled by 
                                                 
96 Jung, supra note 92, at 78–80. 
97 DUAN LIN, RU JIA LUN LI YU FA LÜ WEN HUA: SHE HUI XUE GUAN DIAN DE TAN SUO 
[CONFUCIAN ETHIC AND LEGAL CULTURE: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS] 86–87 (1994). 
98 Id. at 28–29. 
99 See Minshi Susong fa [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law], art. 403 (Taiwan). 
100 Civil Procedure Law, art. 420-1. 
101  See Statistics of Judicial Yuan, Taiwan available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/year96. (indicating from 1999 to 2007, town mediation in 
Taiwan increased from 99,000 to 112,000 cases.) 
102  Statistics of Judicial Yuan, Taiwan available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/year96/08/08_027.pdf. 
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Taiwan’s district courts amounted to 1.37 million cases in 1998, 
increasing to 2.81 million cases in 2008, which is altogether far higher 
than the number of cases resolved by court mediation and town mediation 
combined. 103   On the whole, Taiwanese people are showing more 
inclination to use litigation to address disputes, which is rather consistent 
with their behavior during the late Japanese colonial period. 
Court mediation is not conducted directly by judges, but rather by 
a panel of one to three mediators appointed by the court.104  If the dispute 
is not settled, the process of litigation resumes and neither statements 
made nor any compromises agreed to during the mediation phase may be 
used as the foundation of a later judicial decision.105  The advantage of 
such a distinction is procedural justice, because the judge’s opinion is not 
contaminated by a party’s statement made during court mediation.  One 
potential disadvantage of the court mediation model is that it creates 
unnecessary structural and procedural overlaps with town mediation, as a 
result of the fact that pools of mediators are shared between the two 
systems. 
The above disadvantage could be partly alleviated by the latest 
developments in family mediation.  The new system recruits licensed 
experts, such as social workers, to conduct family mediations and to assist 
divorcing couples in post-divorce arrangements, including custody issues, 
alimony and child support.106  The legal reform was inspired by the work 
of the Child Welfare League Foundation (hereinafter, the Foundation), a 
non-profit organization dedicated to advocating children’s rights for the 
purpose of raising awareness of child welfare issues in Taiwan.107  In the 
process of a divorce, children’s interests are often overlooked.  The two 
ways of applying for a divorce in Taiwan are argued to exacerbate the 
situation of children involved.  Divorce by mutual consent is extremely 
simple, requiring only the submission of a written form with two parties’ 
and two witnesses’ signatures, and the completion of a household 
registration procedure.108  Children’s rights are left to negotiation between 
parents because court supervision is not required in this type of divorce.  
In contrast to the scenario where there is mutual consent, divorce through 
                                                 
103  Statistics of Judicial Yuan, Taiwan available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/year96/08/08_03.pdf. 
104 See Civil Procedure Law, art. 406-1. 
105 See Id. art. 422. 
106 Jing-Hui Hsieh, Tan Shun Jia Shi Tiao Jie Xin Fang Xiang: Yi Taiwan Shilin Di Fang 
Fa Yuan Jia Shi Fa Ting Chu Li Jia Shi Tiao Jie Jing Yan Chu Fa [In Search of the New 
Direction of Family Mediation: Starting from the Experiences of Family Mediation by 
Family Court of Taiwan Shihlin District Court], 9(8) QUAN GUO LU: SHI [TAIWAN BAR 
JOURNAL] 13, 13–14 (2005). 
107 For more information see generally the Child Welfare League Foundation’s website, 
available at http://www.children.org.tw/. 
108 See Minfa [Civil Code], art. 1050 (Taiwan). 
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litigation is a a rather tough process, in which the party wishing to divorce 
must meet a high evidentiary bar.  That party must use concrete and 
legally-accessed evidence to demonstrate the other party’s adultery, use of 
violence, or abandonment.109  In the process of such divorce litigation, 
emphasis is placed on the issue of whether a divorce can be granted, and 
not on the best interests of the child in the post-divorce setting. 
In this context, the Foundation first introduced family conciliation 
in 1996, and after several years of advocacy and preparation began to 
provide consultation services for divorcing couples in 2002.110  Due to the 
increase in divorce cases and the highly emotional setting of family 
mediation, it is necessary for a trained mediator to assist the two parties in 
reaching an agreement that considers the child’s best interests as well as 
the needs of the parents.  A few judges responded to the Foundation’s 
efforts by promoting family mediation in their courts.111  In 2005, the 
Judicial Yuan launched a family mediation pilot project in six district 
courts, and in 2008 promoted this to every family court in Taiwan. 
The non-adversarial approach of using mediation is considered 
appropriate for resolving family disputes, because most disputants either 
live in the same household or need to cooperate with each other in caring 
for children.  To resolve disputes and to restore harmony to families, 
family courts recruit experts such as psychotherapists, lawyers and social 
workers to work with the disputants.  If domestic violence is involved, 
mediation is not allowed unless the mediator has been trained to handle 
such cases or the victim is accompanied by a supportive person.112  
Interestingly, each family court has developed a model of family 
mediation which differs slightly from that of its peers.  For example, in 
T’aipei District Court, two mediators usually meet with each of their 
respective parties separately, and only proceed to a meeting of both 
disputants and mediators to decide the matter with the two parties’ 
consent.113  In T’aichung District Court, however, parties do not have 
separate mediators but both are required to be present in the meeting with 
the mediator.114   Still, judges are the ultimate supervisors of family 
mediation and are responsible for choosing suitable mediators according 
to th nature and type of the family dispute. 
Compared to the mediators who conduct town mediation, the 
mediators in court mediation generally have a higher level of education 
                                                 
109 Id. at art. 1052. 
110 Hsieh, supra note 106, at 15. 
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112 See Jiating Baoli Fangzhifa [Domestic Violence Prevention Act], art. 47 (Taiwan). 
113 Wen-Hsueh Hsiao, Jia Shi Tiao Jie Zhi Yan Jiu: Yi Lun Li Yu Ti Wei Zhong Xin 
[Research on Family Mediation: Focusing on Ethical Issues] 130–31 (2008) (unpublished 
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and more opportunities to partake in specialized training programs.115 The 
facilities that courts provide to such mediation—both physical, such as the 
mediation room, and otherwise, such as legal assistance—are also much 
superior than those available at the township level.  Nevertheless, there are 
emerging challenges that such family mediation must face.  The process of 
providing counseling services, especially where those are provided by 
mediators who are simultaneously psychotherapists and social workers, 
should remain confidential so as to comply with professional ethics.  
Mediators should not be required nor asked to reveal details concerning 
their mediation, so that the judge will not be biased if later the case is to 
be litigated.  However, since judges have the power to supervise and to 
give instructions, there are potential professional conflicts between the 
judge and the court-appointed mediator.  Currently, there are no standard 
rules or operating procedures concerning what kind of information may 
and may not be revealed to the judge during the mediation, because the 
new system has only lately been implemented. One potential consequence 
of not having unified and clear guidelines on this matter could be that the 
two parties will not feel comfortable or safe to speak to mediators for fear 
of making the inevitable disclosure to the judge, and the goal of mediation 
would in this case not be met. 
V. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN STATE LAW AND TRADITIONAL 
CHINESE LEGAL CULTURE 
Taiwan has adopted western legal thoughts and codes since the 
Japanese military takeover in late nineteenth century.  Meanwhile, the 
Taiwanese people’s experiences of dispute resolution continue to be 
influenced by traditional Chinese legal culture.  Even though the state law 
is now completely westernized, the long-lasting legal tradition still has 
power over how law is interpreted and enforced.  Law scholars and 
practitioners in Taiwan have encountered the dilemma of how to reconcile 
state law with Confucian tradition.  In other words, when the “law on the 
books” is not identical to the “law in action,” how might this discrepancy 
impact and transform the system of dispute resolution?  Would the official 
state law simply become ineffective due to a problem of enforceability?  
Or would the construction of traditional legal culture be gradually 
changed? 
As a Chinese society that underwent Japanese colonial rule and a 
process of legal transplantation, Taiwan’s law flows from multiple sources 
                                                 
115 For example, mediators of T’ainan District Court are composed of physicians, lawyers, 
teachers and social workers, who have at least a college degree.  See Taiwan Tainan 
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and exhibits legal pluralism.  Legal pluralism is generally defined as a 
situation in which two or more legal systems coexist in the same social 
field.116  In his pioneering work on “legal levels,” Pospisil claims that 
“every functioning subgroup in society has its own legal system which is 
necessarily different in some respects from those of the other 
subgroups.” 117   By “subgroups” he means sub-units such as family, 
lineage and community that are integral parts of a homogenous society.  
Early studies of legal pluralism examine indigenous legal ways among 
tribal and village people in colonial Asia, Africa, and the Pacific.118  
Tribes and villages had developed some law over generations, on to which 
western law was then imposed by the European colonial powers.  The 
imposed law, forged in a state of industrial capitalism rather than an 
agrarian way of life, embodied very different principles and procedures. 
Before the Japanese military takeover in 1895, Taiwan was ruled 
by the imperial Ch’ing for more than two centuries. The code of the 
imperial Ch’ing was the state law of Taiwan during that period, and was 
deeply influenced by Confucian ideas of dispute resolution.119  Brought by 
Han Chinese immigrants to Taiwan, the Confucian tradition incorporated 
the notions of an anti-lawsuit attitude, law as punishment, a collectivist 
ideal or outlook and family-centered ethics—and melded these into the 
day-to-day life of Taiwanese people.  When Japanese colonial power 
further brought German-style laws and a modern court system to Taiwan, 
representing the western ideals of individualism and of legal rights, the 
consequence of this was that a plurality of legal orders was created. 
For a society like Taiwan, however, the existence of legal 
pluralism is itself of less interest than the relationship between Japanese 
colonial law and the Confucian legal tradition.  On many occasions, state 
law may be utilized as a competent tool for the modernization of Third 
World countries.120  For example, leaders of many post-colonial societies 
often regard their traditional legal system as messy and obstructive to 
                                                 
116 See generally LEOPOLD J. POPISIL, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
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120 See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN 
AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980). 
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progress, and therefore draw on the power of state law to reshape the 
social order. 121   As post-colonial societies endeavor to adopt more 
“civilized” state law for the purpose of modernization, however, they meet 
with intense resistance from those groups whose law has been preserved 
in some fashion.122  This is partly because new laws are thrust upon going 
social arrangements in which there are complexes of binding obligations 
already in existence.123  The social arrangements are often effectively 
stronger than the new laws. 
During the Japanese colonial period, mediators no longer tended 
to be elders of clans or respected local figures, but were individuals 
appointed by the district governments or by Japanese police officers.  At 
the same time, the Han Chinese “old customs” continued to be applied in 
both civil mediation and litigation.  Since traditional Chinese legal culture 
was so deeply rooted in the minds of the Han Chinese populace, the 
preservation of certain customs helped to uphold the legitimacy of the 
Japanese rule and reduced resistance to it from the ruled class.  In the 
course of this dialectical, mutually-constitutive interaction between state 
law and Chinese legal tradition, customs regarding family and succession 
became part of the state law through selective application by the colonial 
courts.  After 1920, Taiwanese became more familiar with modern court 
procedures and learned to work with lawyers.124  In this context, some 
traditional Chinese legal culture was gradually changed.  For example, the 
traditional belief that a wife had no separate legal standing was modified 
because colonial courts afforded Taiwanese women legal standing against 
their husbands in cases of marriage dissolution.125  Although Taiwanese 
women were often powerless in settings of private negotiation, they were 
nevertheless empowered by such colonial court practices and thus became 
more willing to resort to litigation.  In this case, instead of revolutionary 
changes, there was a gradual transformation in women’s access to the 
courts to address family problems. 
After the ROC government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, a second 
westernized legal system—modeled this time after both German and 
Japanese law—was brought to Taiwan.  Compared to town mediation, 
                                                 
121 See, e.g., John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. OF LEGAL PLURALISM 1–55 
(1986). 
122  See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE 
ANTHROPOLOGY 228 (1983) (stating how post-colonial societies respond to attempts to 
enact more “civilized” and modernized laws with resistance). 
123 Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: the Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7(4) LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 719, 723 (1973) (analyzing the 
effects of law being abstracted from the social context in which it exists). 
123 WANG, supra note 51, at 557 (stating how Taiwanese civil matters were governed by 
old Han Chinese customs and laws). 
124 WANG, supra note 45, at 204–13. 
125 Chen, supra note 64, at 218–20. 
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however, the number of lawsuits continued to grow after this point 
because of urbanization and the relocation caused by industrialization.126  
In disputes over family and succession issues, for example, the 2008 
statistics show that the number of litigated cases was around 12 times 
greater than cases under town mediation.127 
Mediation by experts in family courts, which has been adopted in 
Taiwan since 2008, is a new experiment aimed to reduce the cost of 
litigation and tailor results better to disputants’ needs.  Because family 
court mediation has only just been implemented in Taiwan recently, 
studies on this new kind of court mediation are still in their infancy.  
Nevertheless, Taiwan has adopted westernized law for more than a 
century since 1895.  Have long-existing Confucian views about family 
harmony and interpersonal relationships died away?  Or do these still play 
a part in mediators’ approach to resolving family disputes?  More 
empirical studies will be required to learn more about court mediators’ 
state of mind and their views about certain traditional Chinese values. 
One quantitative study that explored the ethical conception and 
behavior of mediators from 17 family courts in Taiwan provides some 
insight on the above questions.  First of all, the study indicated that 53% 
of mediators tended to counsel against divorce for the sole purpose of 
maintaining family harmony, while 47% had never done so.128  It also 
discovered other intriguing facts, such as the following:  in mediating 
family disputes, 55% of mediators often or sometimes suggested that a 
wife who refused to live with her husband’s parents was morally wrong, 
while 45% never made such a suggestion; 52.3% advised that women 
working outside of homes were still responsible for most household 
chores, while only 47.7% reported never having said so.129  Even in the 
context of domestic violence, 48.3% of mediators have at least once told a 
wife that physical violence was not a serious matter; and 49.4% have 
expressed the opinion that a husband’s constant use of swearwords 
towards his wife did not constitute abuse, and therefore should be 
tolerated.130 
                                                 
126 Wang, supra note 2, at 154. 
127 See Judicial Yuan, Difang Fayuan Jiashi Shijian Shoujie Jianshu Yi An Nian Biefen [地
方 法 院 家 事 事 件 收 結 件 數 一 按 年 別 分 ], 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/year97/09/021.pdf (last visited May 8, 2010).  See also 
Taiwan Ministry of the Interior, Summary of Mediation Services Conducted [辦理調解業
務概況], http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/year/y01-09.xls (last visited May 8, 2010). 
128 Hsiao, supra note 113, at 162 (providing statistics from a study that revealed how 53% 
of mediators advised against divorce in order to maintain familial harmony). 
129 Id. at 170–72 (providing statistics demonstrating that 55% of mediators have suggested 
that a wife is morally wrong for refusing to live with her husband’s parents). 
130 Id. at 173 (providing statistics showing that almost 50% of mediators do not believe 
violence is a serious matter and also do not think the pervasive use of swear words against 
a wife constitutes abuse). 
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Judging from above statistics, although court mediators in Taiwan 
tend to be better-educated and more professionally advanced than their 
town mediator peers, they may still be subject to a strong influence from 
certain patriarchal ideas embedded in Taiwan’s traditional culture.  One 
idea, for instance, is the Confucian principle of maintaining family 
harmony at any cost—and often at the cost of a woman making her own 
choices about her life, as well as the principle of gender equality, and even 
personal safety.  A similar study has not yet been carried out for town 
mediation, which still awaits a future survey.  The above study did 
indicate, however, that mediator gender and age were the most statistically 
significant variables insofar as their attitude towards gender equality was 
concerned.131  Specifically, female mediators and mediators under the age 
of sixty years displayed far greater awareness of ethical behavior and so 
did those mediators under sixty years old.132 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The legal operation of dispute resolution can be viewed as a 
continuum, with private negotiation between disputants at one end and 
litigation on the other.  Between the two ends are:  mediation within a clan, 
town mediation, and court mediation.  From informal private settlement to 
formal judicial decision, the influence of Confucian teaching generally 
declines while the control of the law tightens.  Traditionally, Taiwanese 
people have preferred to settle civil and family disputes outside of courts 
and through informal means, due to the continuing influence of traditional 
Chinese legal culture.  The modern town mediation, which is derived from 
the German civil procedure laws, however, is different from traditional 
mediation in many ways.  For example, traditional clan or town mediation 
is a private way of resolving disputes, while modern town mediation has 
been controlled by either township officers—in Japanese colonial times 
and the early Nationalist government era—or alternately the courts, which 
are responsible for supervising it at present.  As for in-court mediation, it 
is modeled on western laws and therefore it has no parallel in traditional 
Taiwanese society. 
In the context of Taiwan’s legal modernization, this article 
examined the history and evolution of civil mediation in Taiwan from the 
beginning of the Japanese colonial era in 1895, up to 2008 when the new 
system of family court mediation was implemented to every district court 
in Taiwan.  Traditional Chinese culture is not entirely compatible with 
westernized state law first adopted by the Japanese colonial government.  
                                                 
131 Id. at 34 (referencing a study that showed a mediator’s gender and age to be the most 
significant factors in their views concerning gender equality). 
132 Id. at 181–84 (referencing a study that showed female mediators and mediators under 
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However, because of the increase in judicial staff and funding required, 
the progress of economic development and the growing prevalence of 
education among Taiwanese people, a major transition has occurred over 
this period and gradually, Taiwanese have reached the point where they 
resort to courts more often than they will to mediation.133  This inclination 
to engage in civil litigation has continued to grow during the Nationalist 
government era beginning in 1949. 
However, the new westernized state law and Chinese tradition 
have not always been mutually exclusive.  The dynamics of change and 
transformation between legal orders holds especially true in the area of 
family issues.  On the one hand, Taiwan’s current family law was enacted 
in 1930 with German law influences that emphasized individualism, 
personal rights and gender equality.  On the other, the traditional Chinese 
values of collectivism, interpersonal harmony, and patriarchy continue to 
affect the way in which law is interpreted and enforced in Taiwan.  Setting 
aside the “state-law-versus-custom” dichotomy, this ever-evolving process 
of dialectic, resistance and melding between different legal orders shows 
no signs of abatement, and will continue to affect life and legal practice in 
Taiwan. 
                                                 
133 WANG, supra note 45, at 204–13. 
